The United States and its allies once more stand on the brink of war with Iraq. What makes this war different, however, is that its primary goal is to replace the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein with a democratic form of government. In the opinion of the Bush administration, removal of Saddam and his weapons of mass destruction will bring stability to the Middle East and the world. While there is consensus to remove Saddam and destroy his weapons, there is disagreement among the experts as to how to accomplish it. Kenneth Pollack is a specialist on Iraq whose experience as an analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council gives him a unique vantage point from which to comment on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. In
The Threatening Storm, Pollack posits that a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq is the only logical means to end Saddam's regime. This argument results from a thorough discussion of the rise of the current regime and of Iraq's relationships with its neighbors and the West, followed by a painstaking analysis of the several options available.
In the case of Iraq, says Pollack, our vital national interest, as well as that of the entire world, clearly lies in the economic stability of the region based on ability to export crude oil without interference. Following the Gulf War of 1990-91, the United Nations implemented a number of measures to contain Iraqi ambitions. A short time later, teams of weapons experts entered the country to locate and destroy chemical and biological weapons stockpiles and production facilities. In 1998 Iraq threw out the inspection teams, and for the past four years, notes Pollack, the Iraqis have allegedly been reacquiring chemical and biological weapons and have reenergized their research programs to develop nuclear weapons. Some world leaders and strategists have proposed five options for dealing with what they claim is a clear and present danger to their vital national interest in the Persian Gulf. These options are containment, deterrence, covert action, the "Afghan" approach, and invasion.
Containment has been the policy since the end of the Gulf War. Originally, it had two key components: weapons inspections and economic sanctions. With the eviction of the weapons inspectors, economic sanctions became the sole functioning component of the policy. The oil-for-food program and smuggling, as well as reluctance on the part of some allies, notably France and Citing Samuel Huntington's classic The Soldier and the State, Cohen describes the "normal" theory of civil-military relations, "which holds that the healthiest and most effective form of civilian control of the military is that which maximizes professionalism by isolating soldiers from politics, and giving them as free a hand as possible in military matters." This idea is widely and often unquestioningly accepted by serving military officers, reinforced by the apparent lessons of Vietnam, when such tenets were held to be violated, in contrast with the successes of DESERT STORM, when the military was ostensibly properly left alone to win the war. Indeed, for civilians to "ask too many questions (let alone give orders) about tactics, particular pieces of hardware, the design of a campaign, measures of success, or to press too closely for the promotion or dismissal of anything other than the most senior officers is meddling and interference, which is inappropriate and downright dangerous."
